Choosing Products in Social Networks by Simon, Sunil & Apt, Krzysztof R.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
2.
22
09
v2
  [
cs
.SI
]  
29
 N
ov
 20
12
Choosing Products in Social Networks
Sunil Simon ∗ Krzysztof R. Apt †
Abstract
We study the consequences of adopting products by agents who form
a social network. To this end we use the threshold model introduced
in [2], in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one
out of several alternatives, and associate with each such social network a
strategic game between the agents. The possibility of not choosing any
product results in two special types of (pure) Nash equilibria.
We show that such games may have no Nash equilibrium and that
determining the existence of a Nash equilibrium, also of a special type,
is NP-complete. The situation changes when the underlying graph of the
social network is a DAG, a simple cycle, or has no source nodes. For
these three classes we determine the complexity of establishing whether a
(special type of) Nash equilibrium exists.
We also clarify for these categories of games the status and the com-
plexity of the finite improvement property (FIP). Further, we introduce a
new property of the uniform FIP which is satisfied when the underlying
graph is a simple cycle, but determining it is co-NP-hard in the general
case and also when the underlying graph has no source nodes. The latter
complexity results also hold for verifying the property of being a weakly
acyclic game.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Social networks are a thriving interdisciplinary research area with links to so-
ciology, economics, epidemiology, computer science, and mathematics. A flurry
of numerous articles and recent books, see, e.g., [7], testifies to the relevance of
this field. It deals with such diverse topics as epidemics, analysis of the connec-
tivity, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour, effects of advertising, and
emergence of ‘bubbles’ in financial markets.
One of the prevalent types of models of social networks are the threshold
models introduced in [8]. In such a setup each node i has a threshold θ(i) ∈ (0, 1]
and adopts an ‘item’ given in advance (which can be a disease, trend, or a specific
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product) when the total weight of incoming edges from the nodes that have
already adopted this item exceeds the threshold. One of the most important
issues studied in the threshold models has been that of the spread of an item,
see, e.g., [14, 11, 6]. From now on we shall refer to an ‘item’ that is spread by
a more specific name of a ‘product’.
In this context very few papers dealt with more than one product. One of
them is [9] with its focus on the notions of compatibility and bilinguality that
result when one adopts both available products at an extra cost. Another one
is [4], where the authors investigate whether the algorithmic approach of [11]
can be extended to the case of two products.
In [2] the authors introduced a new threshold model of a social network in
which nodes (agents) influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of sev-
eral products. This model allowed us to study various aspects of the spread of a
given product through a social network, in the presence of other products. We
analysed from the complexity point of view the problems of determining whether
adoption of a given product by the whole network is possible (respectively, nec-
essary), and when a unique outcome of the adoption process is guaranteed. We
also clarified for social networks without unique outcomes the complexity of
determining whether a given node has to adopt some (respectively, a given)
product in some (respectively, all) final network(s), and the complexity of com-
puting the minimum and the maximum possible spread of a given product.
1.2 Motivation
Our interest here is in understanding and predicting the behaviour of the con-
sumers (agents) who form a social network and are confronted with several
alternatives (products). To carry out such an analysis we use the above model
of [2] and associate with each such social network a natural strategic game. In
this game the strategies of an agent are products he can choose. Additionally a
‘null’ strategy is available that models the decision of not choosing any product.
The idea is that after each agent chose a product, or decided not to choose any,
the agents assess the optimality of their choices comparing them to the choices
made by their neighbours. This leads to a natural study of (pure) Nash equilib-
ria, in particular of those in which some, respectively all, constituent strategies
are non-null.
Social network games are related to graphical games of [10], in which the
payoff function of each player depends only on a (usually small) number of other
players. In this work the focus was mainly on finding mixed (approximate)
Nash equilibria. However, in graphical games the underlying structures are
undirected graphs. Also, social network games exhibit the following join the
crowd property: the payoff of each player depends only on his strategy and
on the set of players who chose his strategy and weakly increases when more
players choose his strategy.
Since these games are related to social networks, some natural special cases
are of interest: when the underlying graph is a DAG, has no source nodes or a
simple cycle which is a special case of a graph without source nodes. Such social
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networks correspond respectively to a hierarchical organization or to a ‘circle of
friends’, in which everybody has a friend (a neighbour). Studying Nash equilib-
ria of these games and various properties defined in terms of improvement paths
allows us to gain better insights into the consequences of adopting products.
1.3 Related work
There are a number of papers that focus on games associated with various forms
of networks, see, e.g., [15] for an overview. A more recent example is [1] that
analyses a strategic game between players being firms who select nodes in an
undirected graph in order to advertise competing products via ‘viral marketing’.
However, in spite of the focus on similar questions concerning the existence and
structure of Nash equilibria and on their reachability, from a technical point
of view, the games studied here seem to be unrelated to the games studied
elsewhere.
Still, it is useful to mention the following phenomenon. When the underlying
graph of a social network has no source nodes, the game always has a trivial Nash
equilibrium in which no agent chooses a product. A similar phenomenon has
been recently observed in [5] in the case of their network formation games, where
such equilibria are called degenerate. Further, note that the ‘join the crowd’
property is exactly the opposite of the defining property of the congestion games
with player-specific payoff functions introduced in [12]. In these game the payoff
of each player weakly decreases when more players choose his strategy. Because
in our case (in contrast to [12]) the players can have different strategy sets, the
resulting games are not coordination games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games
Assume a set {1, . . . , n} of players, where n > 1. A strategic game for n
players, written as (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists of a non-empty set Si of
strategies and a payoff function pi : S1 × . . .× Sn → R, for each player i.
Fix a strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We denote S1 × · · · × Sn
by S, call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy, denote the ith element of s by
si, and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i. We also write (si, s−i) instead
of s. We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of
his opponents if ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i). Next, we call a joint strategy
s a Nash equilibrium if each si is a best response to s−i, that is, if
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
Given a joint strategy s we call the sum SW (s) =
∑n
j=1 pj(s) the social
welfare of s. When the social welfare of s is maximal we call s a social
optimum. Recall that, given a finite game that has a Nash equilibrium, its
price of anarchy (respectively, price of stability) is the ratio SW (s)
SW (s′) where
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s is a social optimum and s′ is a Nash equilibrium with the lowest (respectively,
highest) social welfare. For division by zero, we interpret the outcome as ∞.
Next, we call a strategy si of player i a better response given a joint
strategy s if pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i). Following the terminology of [13], a path
in S is a sequence (s1, s2, . . .) of joint strategies such that for every k > 1
there is a player i such that sk = (s′i, s
k−1
−i ) for some s
′
i 6= s
k−1
i . A path ξ is
called an improvement path if it is maximal and for all k smaller than the
length of ξ, pi(sk) > pi(sk−1), where i is the player who deviated from sk−1.
The last condition simply means that each deviating player selects a better
response. A game has the finite improvement property (in short, FIP) if
every improvement path is finite. Obviously, if a game has the FIP, then it has
a Nash equilibrium–the last element of each path.
Finally, recall that a game is called weakly acyclic (see [12]) if for every
joint strategy there exists a finite improvement path that starts at it.
2.2 Social networks
We are interested in specific strategic games defined over social networks. In
what follows we focus on a model of social networks recently introduced in [2].
Let V = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents and G = (V,E,w) a weighted
directed graph with wij ∈ [0, 1] being the weight of the edge (i, j). We often use
the notation i→ j to denote (i, j) ∈ E and write i→∗ j if there is a path from
i to j in the graph G. Given a node i of G we denote by N(i) the set of nodes
from which there is an incoming edge to i. We call each j ∈ N(i) a neighbour
of i in G. We assume that for each node i such that N(i) 6= ∅,
∑
j∈N(i) wji ≤ 1.
An agent i ∈ V is said to be a source node in G if N(i) = ∅.
Let P be a finite set of alternatives or products. By a social network (from
now on, just network) we mean a tuple S = (G,P , P, θ), where P assigns to
each agent i a non-empty set of products P (i) from which it can make a choice.
θ is a threshold function that for each i ∈ V and t ∈ P (i) yields a value
θ(i, t) ∈ (0, 1].
Given a network S we denote by source(S) the set of source nodes in the
underlying graph G. One of the classes of the networks we shall study are the
ones with source(S) = ∅.
2.3 Social network games
Fix a network S = (G,P , P, θ). Each agent can adopt a product from his
product set or choose not to adopt any product. We denote the latter choice by
t0.
With each network S we associate a strategic game G(S). The idea is that
the nodes simultaneously choose a product or abstain from choosing any. Sub-
sequently each node assesses his choice by comparing it with the choices made
by his neighbours. Formally, we define the game as follows: the players are the
agents, the set of strategies for player i is Si := P (i) ∪ {t0}, for i ∈ V , t ∈ P (i)
and a joint strategy s, let N ti (s) := {j ∈ N(i) | sj = t}, i.e., N
t
i (s) is the set of
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neighbours of i who adopted in s the product t. The payoff function is defined
as follows, where c0 is some positive constant given in advance:
• for i ∈ source(S), pi(s) :=
{
0 if si = t0
c0 if si ∈ P (i)
• for i 6∈ source(S), pi(s) :=


0 if si = t0∑
j∈N t
i
(s)
wji − θ(i, t) if si = t, for some t ∈ P (i) .
Let us explain the underlying motivations behind the above definition. In
the first entry we assume that the payoff function for the source nodes is con-
stant only for simplicity. In the last section of the paper we explain that the
obtained results hold equally well in the case when the source nodes have arbi-
trary positive utility for each product.
The second entry in the payoff definition is motivated by the following con-
siderations. When agent i is not a source node, his ‘satisfaction’ from a joint
strategy depends positively from the accumulated weight (read: ‘influence’)
of his neighbours who made the same choice as him, and negatively from his
threshold level (read: ‘resistance’) to adopt this product. The assumption that
θ(i, t) > 0 reflects the view that there is always some resistance to adopt a prod-
uct. So when this resistance is high, it can happen that the payoff is negative.
Of course, in such a situation not adopting any product, represented by the
strategy t0, is a better alternative.
The presence of this possibility allows each agent to refrain from choosing a
product. This refers to natural situations, such as deciding not to purchase a
smartphone or not going on vacation. In the last section we refer to an initiated
research on social network games in which the strategy t0 is not present. Such
games capture situations in which the agents have to take some decision, for
instance selecting a secondary school for their children.
By definition the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies chosen
by his neighbours, so the social network games are related to graphical games
of [10]. However, the underlying dependence structure of a social network game
is a directed graph and the presence of the special strategy t0 available to each
player makes these games more specific.
In what follows for t ∈ P ∪ {t0} we use the notation t to denote the joint
strategy s where sj = t for all j ∈ V . This notation is legal only if for all
agents i it holds that t ∈ P (i). The presence of the strategy t0 motivates the
introduction and study of special types of Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium
s is
• determined if for all i, si 6= t0,
• non-trivial if for some i, si 6= t0,
• trivial if for all i, si = t0, i.e., s = t0.
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3 Nash equilibria: general case
The first natural question that we address is that of the existence of Nash
equilibria in the social network games. We establish the following result.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has a (respec-
tively, non-trivial) Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
To prove it we first construct an example of a social network game with no
Nash equilibrium and then use it to determine the complexity of the existence
of Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Consider the network given in Figure 1, where the product set of
each agent is marked next to the node denoting it and the weights are labels
on the edges. The source nodes are represented by the unique product in the
product set.
{t1}
w1

1
w2
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
{t1,t2}
{t2} w1
// 3
w2
::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉{t2,t3}
2
w2
oo
{t1,t3}
{t3}w1
oo
Figure 1: A network with no Nash equilibrium
So the weights on the edges from the nodes {t1}, {t2}, {t3} are marked by
w1 and the weights on the edges forming the triangle are marked by w2. We
assume that each threshold is a constant θ, where θ < w1 < w2. So it is more
profitable to a player residing on a triangle to adopt the product adopted by his
neighbour residing on a triangle than by the other neighbour who is a source
node. For convenience we represent each joint strategy as a triple of strategies
of players 1, 2 and 3.
It is easy to check that in the game associated with this network no joint
strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, each agent residing on the triangle can
secure a payoff of at least w1−θ > 0, so it suffices to analyze the joint strategies
in which t0 is not used. There are in total eight such joint strategies. Here is
their listing, where in each joint strategy we underline the strategy that is not
a best response to the choice of other players: (t1, t1, t2), (t1, t1, t3), (t1, t3, t2),
(t1, t3, t3), (t2, t1, t2), (t2, t1, t3), (t2, t3, t2), (t2, t3, t3). ✷
Proof of Theorem 1. As in [2], to show NP-hardness, we use a reduction from the
NP-complete PARTITION problem, which is: given n positive rational numbers
(a1, . . ., an), is there a set S such that
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai? Consider an instance
I of PARTITION. Without loss of generality, suppose we have normalised the
numbers so that
∑n
i=1 ai = 1. Then the problem instance sounds: does there
exist a set S such that
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2?
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To construct the appropriate network we employ the networks given in Fig-
ure 1 and in Figure 2, where for each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we set wia = wib = ai,
and assume that the threshold of the nodes a and b is constant and equal 12 .
1
{t1,t
′
1
}
w1a

w1b
,,❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨❨
❨❨❨❨ 2
{t1,t
′
1
}
w2a
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
② w2b
''
··· n
{t1,t
′
1
}
wna
mm
wnb

a
{t1}
b
{t′
1
}
Figure 2: A network related to the PARTITION problem
We use two copies of the network given in Figure 1, one unchanged and
the other in which the product t1 is replaced by t′1, and construct the desired
network S by identifying the node a of the network from Figure 2 with the node
marked by {t1} in the network from Figure 1, and the node b with the node
marked by {t′1} in the modified version of the network from Figure 1.
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists, i.e., for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2 . Consider the game G(S) and the joint strategy formed by the following
strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S in the network from Figure 2,
• t′1 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S in the network from Figure 2,
• t0 assigned to the nodes a, b and the nodes 1 in both versions of the
network from Figure 1,
• t3 assigned to the nodes 2, 3 in both versions of the networks from Figure 1
and the two nodes marked by {t3},
• t2 assigned to the nodes marked by {t2}.
We claim that this joint strategy is a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Consider
first the player (i.e, node) a. The accumulated weight of its neighbours who
chose strategy t1 is 12 , so its payoff after switching to the strategy t1 is 0.
Therefore t0 is indeed a best response for player a. For the same reason, t0 is also
a best response for player b. The analysis for the other nodes is straightforward.
Conversely, suppose that a joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium in the
game G(S). Then it is also a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. We claim that
the strategy selected by the node a in s is t0. Otherwise, this strategy equals
t1 and the strategies selected by the nodes of the network of Figure 1 form
a Nash equilibrium in the game associated with this network. This yields a
contradiction with our previous analysis of this network.
So t0 is a best response of the node a to the strategies of the other players
chosen in s. This means that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≤
1
2 . By the same reasoning
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t0 is a best response of the node b to the strategies of the other players chosen
in s. This means that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t′1
wib ≤
1
2 .
But
∑n
i=1 ai = 1 and for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, wia = wib = ai, and si ∈ {t1, t
′
1}.
So both above inequalities are in fact equalities. Consequently for S := {i ∈
{1, . . ., n} | si = t1} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai. In other words, there exists a
solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem.
To prove that the problem lies in NP it suffices to notice that given a network
S = (G,P , P, θ) with n nodes checking if a joint strategy is a non-trivial Nash
equilibrium can be done by means of n · |P| checks, so in polynomial time.
4 Nash equilibria: special cases
In view of the fact that in general Nash equilibria may not exist we now consider
networks with special properties of the underlying directed graph. We consider
first networks whose underlying graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Intu-
itively, such networks correspond to hierarchical organizations.
Theorem 3. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a DAG.
(i) G(S) always has a non-trivial Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Deciding whether G(S) has a determined Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Theorem 4. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ) whose underlying graph is a
simple cycle. There is a procedure that runs in time O(|P| · n), where n is the
number of nodes in G, that decides whether G(S) has a non-trivial (respectively,
determined) Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5. The price of anarchy and the price of stability for the games
associated with the networks whose underlying graph is a DAG or a simple cycle
is unbounded.
Finally, we consider the case when the underlying graph G = (V,E) of a
network S has no source nodes, i.e., for all i ∈ V , N(i) 6= ∅. Intuitively,
such a network corresponds to a ‘circle of friends’: everybody has a friend (a
neighbour). For such networks we prove the following result.
Theorem 6. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ) whose underlying graph has
no source nodes. There is a procedure that runs in time O(|P| · n3), where n
is the number of nodes in G, that decides whether G(S) has a non-trivial Nash
equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 6 requires some characterization results that are of
independent interest. The following concept plays a crucial role. Here and
elsewhere we only consider subgraphs that are induced and identify each such
subgraph with its set of nodes. (Recall that (V ′, E′) is an induced subgraph of
(V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and E′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′).)
We say that a (non-empty) strongly connected subgraph (in short, SCS) Ct
of G is self sustaining for a product t if for all i ∈ Ct,
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• t ∈ P (i),
•
∑
j∈N(i)∩Ct
wji ≥ θ(i, t).
An easy observation is that if S is a network with no source nodes, then it
always has a trivial Nash equilibrium, t0. The following lemma states that for
such networks every non-trivial Nash equilibrium satisfies a structural property
which relates it to the set of self sustaining SCSs in the underlying graph. We
use the following notation: for a joint strategy s and product t, At(s) := {i ∈
V | si = t} and P (s) := {t | ∃i ∈ V with si = t}.
Lemma 7. Let S = (G,P , P, θ) be a network whose underlying graph has no
source nodes. If s 6= t0 is a Nash equilibrium in G(S) then for all products
t ∈ P (s) \ {t0} and i ∈ At(s) there exists a self sustaining SCS Ct ⊆ At(s) for
t and j ∈ Ct such that j →∗ i.
Lemma 8. Let S = (G,P , P, θ) be a network whose underlying graph has no
source nodes. The joint strategy t0 is a unique Nash equilibrium in G(S) iff
there does not exist a product t and a self sustaining SCS Ct for t in G.
Proof. (⇐) By Lemma 7.
(⇒) Suppose there exists a self sustaining SCS Ct for a product t. Let R be the
set of nodes reachable from Ct which eventually can adopt product t. Formally,
R :=
⋃
m∈NRm where
• R0 := Ct,
• Rm+1 := Rm ∪ {j | t ∈ P (j) and
∑
k∈N(j)∩Rm
wkj ≥ θ(j, t)}.
Let s be the joint strategy such that for all j ∈ R, we have sj = t and for
all k ∈ V \R, we have sk = t0. It follows directly from the definition of R that
s satisfies the following properties:
(P1) for all i ∈ V , si = t0 or si = t,
(P2) for all i ∈ V , si 6= t0 iff i ∈ R,
(P3) for all i ∈ V , if i ∈ R then pi(s) ≥ 0.
We show that s is a Nash equilibrium. Consider first any j such that sj = t
(so sj 6= t0). By (P2) j ∈ R and by (P3) pj(s) ≥ 0. Since pj(s−j , t0) =
0 ≤ pj(s), player j does not gain by deviating to t0. Further, by (P1), for
all k ∈ N(j), sk = t or sk = t0 and therefore for all products t′ 6= t we have
pj(s−j , t′) < 0 ≤ pj(s). Thus player j does not gain by deviating to any product
t′ 6= t either.
Next, consider any j such that sj = t0. We have pj(s) = 0 and from (P2) it
follows that j 6∈ R. By the definition of R we have
∑
k∈N(j)∩R
wkj < θ(j, t). Thus
pj(s−j , t) < 0. Moreover, for all products t′ 6= t we also have pj(s−j , t′) < 0 for
the same reason as above. So player j does not gain by a unilateral deviation.
We conclude that s is a Nash equilibrium.
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For a product t ∈ P , we define the set Xt :=
⋂
m∈NX
m
t , where
• X0t := {i ∈ V | t ∈ P (i)},
• Xm+1t := {i ∈ V |
∑
j∈N(i)∩Xm
t
wji ≥ θ(i, t)}.
The following characterization leads to a direct proof of the claimed result.
Lemma 9. Let S be a network whose underlying graph has no source nodes.
There exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in G(S) iff there exists a product t
such that Xt 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose S = (G,P , P, θ).
(⇒) It follows directly from the definitions that if there is a self sustaining SCS
Ct for product t then Ct ⊆ Xt. Suppose now that for all t, Xt = ∅. Then for
all t, there is no self sustaining SCS for t. So by Lemma 8, t0 is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
(⇐) Suppose there exists t such that Xt 6= ∅. Let s be the joint strategy defined
as follows:
si :=
{
t if i ∈ Xt
t0 if i 6∈ Xt
By the definition of Xt, for all i ∈ Xt, pi(s) ≥ 0. So no player i ∈ Xt gains
by deviating to t0 (as then his payoff would become 0) or to a product t′ 6= t (as
then his payoff would become negative since no player adopted t′). Also, by the
definition of Xt and of the joint strategy s, for all i 6∈ Xt and for all t′ ∈ P (i),
pi(t′, s−i) < 0. Therefore, no player i 6∈ Xt gains by deviating to a product t′
either. It follows that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6. On the account of Lemma 9, the following procedure can
be used to check for the existence of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium.
found := false;
while P 6= ∅ and ¬found do
choose t ∈ P ;
P := P − {t};
compute Xt;
found := (Xt 6= ∅)
od
return found
To assess its complexity, note that for a network S = (G,P , P, θ) and a fixed
product t, the set Xt can be constructed in time O(n3), where n is the number
of nodes in G. Indeed, each iteration of Xmt requires at most O(n
2) comparisons
and the fixed point is reached after at most n steps. In the worst case, we need
to compute Xt for every t ∈ P , so the procedure runs in time O(|P| · n3). In
fact, the proof of Lemma 9 shows that if a non-trivial Nash equilibrium exists,
then it can be constructed in polynomial time as well.
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5 The FIP and the uniform FIP
A natural question is whether the games for which we established the existence
of a Nash equilibrium belong to some well-defined class of strategic games, for
instance, games with the finite improvement property (FIP). When the under-
lying graph of the network is a DAG, the game does indeed have the FIP. The
following theorem shows that the result can be improved in the case of two
player social network games.
Theorem 10. Every two players social network game has the FIP.
Proof. By the above comment on DAGs, we can assume that the underlying
graph is a cycle, say 1 → 2 → 1. Consider an improvement path ρ. Without
loss of generality we can assume that the players alternate their moves in ρ.
In what follows given an element of ρ (that is not the last one) we underline
the strategy of the player who moves, i.e., selects a better response. We call
each element of ρ of the type (t, t) or (t, t) a match. Further, we shorten the
statement “each time player i switches his strategy his payoff strictly increases
and it never decreases when his opponent switches strategy” to “player i’s payoff
steadily goes up”.
Consider two successive matches in ρ, based respectively on the strategies t
and t1. The corresponding segment of ρ is one of the following four types.
Type 1. (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1). The fragment of ρ that starts at (t, t) and finishes at
(t1, t1) has the form: (t, t)⇒ (t2, t)⇒∗ (t1, t3)⇒ (t1, t1). Then player 1’s payoff
steadily goes up. Additionally, in the step (t1, t3)⇒ (t1, t1) his payoff increases
by w21. In turn, in the step (t, t) ⇒ (t2, t) player 2’s payoff decreases by w12
and in the remaining steps his payoff steadily goes up. So p1(t¯) + w21 < p1(t1)
and p2(t¯)− w12 < p2(t1).
Type 2. (t, t) ⇒∗ (t1, t1). Then player 1’s payoff steadily goes up. In turn, in
the first step of (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1) the payoff of player 2 decreases by w12, while in
the last step (in which player 1 moves) his payoff increases by w12. So these two
payoff changes cancel against each other. Additionally, in the remaining steps
player 2’s payoff steadily goes up. So p1(t¯) < p1(t1) and p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
Type 3. (t, t) ⇒∗ (t1, t1). This type is symmetric to Type 2, so p1(t¯) < p1(t1)
and p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
Type 4. (t, t) ⇒∗ (t1, t1). This type is symmetric to Type 1, so p1(t¯) − w21 <
p1(t1) and p2(t¯) + w12 < p2(t1).
Table 1 summarizes the changes in the payoffs between the two matches.
Consider now a match (t, t) in ρ and a match (t1, t1) that appears later in
ρ. Let Ti denote the number of internal segments of type i that occur in the
fragment of ρ that starts with (t, t) and ends with (t1, t1).
Case 1. T1 ≥ T4. Then Table 1 shows that the aggregate increase in p1 in
segments of type 1 exceeds the aggregate decrease in segments of type 4. So
p1(t¯) < p1(t1).
Case 2. T1 < T4. Then analogously Table 1 shows that p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
We conclude that t 6= t1. By symmetry the same conclusion holds if the
considered matches are of the form (t, t) and (t1, t1). This proves that each
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Type p1 p2
1 increases decreases
by > w21 by < w12
2, 3 increases increases
4 decreases increases
by < w21 by > w12
Table 1: Changes in p1 and p2
match occurs in ρ at most once. So in some suffix η of ρ no match occurs. But
each step in η increases the social welfare, so η is finite, and so is ρ.
The FIP ceases to hold when the underlying graph has cycles. Figure 3(a)
gives an example. Take any threshold and weight functions which satisfy the
condition that an agent gets positive payoff when he chooses the product picked
by his unique predecessor in the graph. Figure 3(b) then shows an infinite
improvement path. In each joint strategy, we underline the strategy that is not
a best response to the choice of other players. Note that at each step of this
improvement path a best response is used. On the other hand, one can check
that for any initial joint strategy there exists a finite improvement path. This
is an instance of a more general result proved below.
1
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{t1,t2}
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
(t2,t1,t1)
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Figure 3: A social network with an infinite improvement path
By a scheduler we mean a function f that given a joint strategy s that is
not a Nash equilibrium selects a player who did not select in s a best response.
An improvement path ξ = s1, s2, . . . conforms to a scheduler f if for all k
smaller than the length of ξ, sk+1 = (s′i, s
k
−i), where f(s
k) = i. We say that a
strategic game has the uniform FIP if there exists a scheduler f such that all
improvement paths ρ which conform to f are finite. The property of having the
uniform FIP is stronger than that of being weakly acyclic, see [3].
Theorem 11. Let S be a network such that the underlying graph is a simple
cycle. Then the game G(S) has the uniform FIP.
Proof. We use the scheduler f that given a joint strategy s chooses the smallest
index i such that si is not a best response to s−i. So this scheduler selects a
player again if he did not switch to a best response. Therefore we can assume
that each selected player immediately selects a best response.
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Consider a joint strategy s taken from a ‘best response’ improvement path.
Observe that for all k if sk ∈ P (k) and pk(s) ≥ 0 (so in particular if sk is a best
response to s−k), then sk = sk⊖1. So for all i > 1, the following property holds:
Z(i): if f(s) = i and si−1 ∈ P (i− 1) then for all j ∈ {n, 1, . . ., i− 1}, sj = si−1.
In words: if i is the first player who did not choose a best response and player
i−1 strategy is a product, then this product is a strategy of every earlier player
and of player n. Along each ‘best response’ improvement path that conforms
to f the value of f(s) strictly increases until the path terminates or at certain
stage f(s) = n. In the latter case if sn−1 = t0, then the unique best response
for player n is t0. Otherwise sn−1 ∈ P (n − 1), so on the account of property
Z(n) all players’ strategies equal the same product and the payoff of player n
is negative (since f(s) = n). So the unique best response for player n is t0, as
well.
This switch begins a new round with player 1 as the next scheduled player.
Player 1 also switches to t0 and from now on every consecutive player switches
to t0, as well. The resulting path terminates once player n−2 switches to t0.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied the consequences of adopting products by agents who
form a social network. To this end we analysed a natural class of strategic games
associated with the class of social networks introduced in [2]. The following
table summarizes our complexity and existence results, where we refer to the
underlying graph with n nodes.
property arbitrary DAG simple cycle no source
nodes
Arbitrary NE NP-complete always exists always exists always exists
Non-trivial NE NP-complete always exists O(|P| · n) O(|P| · n3)
Determined NE NP-complete NP-complete O(|P| · n) NP-complete
FIP co-NP-hard yes – co-NP-hard
Uniform FIP co-NP-hard yes yes co-NP-hard
Weakly acyclic co-NP-hard yes yes co-NP-hard
In the definition of the social network games we took a number of simplifying
assumptions. In particular, we stipulated that the source nodes have a constant
payoff c0 > 0. One could allow the source nodes to have arbitrary positive
utility for different products. This would not affect any proofs. Indeed, in
the Nash equilibria the source nodes would select only the products with the
highest payoff, so the other products in their product sets could be disregarded.
Further, the FIP, the uniform FIP and weak acyclicity of a social network game
is obviously not affected by such a modification.
The results of this paper can be slightly generalized by using a more general
notion of a threshold that would also depend on the set of neighbours who
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adopted a given product. In this more general setup for i ∈ V , t ∈ P (i) and
X ⊆ N(i), the threshold function θ yields a value θ(i, t,X) ∈ (0, 1] and
satisfies the following monotonicity condition: if X1 ⊆ X2 then θ(i, t,X1) ≥
θ(i, t,X2). Intuitively, agent i’s resistance to adopt a product decreases when
the set of its neighbours who adopted it increases. We decided not to use this
definition for the sake of readability.
This work can be pursued in a couple of natural directions. One is the
study of social networks with other classes of underlying graphs. Another is an
investigation of the complexity results for other classes of social networks, in
particular for the equitable ones, i.e., networks in which the weight functions
are defined as wij = 1|N(i)| nodes i and j ∈ N(i). One could also consider other
equilibrium concepts like the strict Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we also initiated a study of slightly different games, in which the
players are obliged to choose a product, so the games in which the strategy t0
is absent. Such games naturally correspond to situations in which the agents
always choose a product, for instance a subscription for their mobile telephone.
These games substantially differ from the ones considered here. For example,
Nash equilibrium may not exist when the underlying graph is a simple cycle.
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